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Despite China’s growing political and economic involvement in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), Beijing has not succeeded in making an attractive offer to the region’s EU member 
states – who make up the majority of the participants in the ‘16+1’ format. The financing 
model proposed by China, based on loans and favouritism towards Chinese companies, has 
proved to be unsuitable to local conditions. Therefore, the much-discussed infrastructure co-
operation has not even started. Consequently, Beijing has failed to obtain the political tools 
which could have weakened policy coherence at the European level, or even divided the EU. 
In this context, the allegations appearing in the public debate that the countries of the ‘16+1’ 
have been fostering divisions within the EU seem to be substantially incorrect. As long as 
Central and Eastern Europe remains capable of pursuing its economic and developmental in-
terests within the architecture of the European Union, the political risks coming from China’s 
capital inflow will remain limited. At the same time, the EU has room to facilitate constructive 
economic relationships between China and the Central European region. For example, it could 
reduce Beijing’s political pressure on CEE to use the specific, Chinese model for financing and 
building infrastructure. Cooperation at the EU level could also help to adapt the Chinese offer 
to the European business and regulatory environment.
Cooperation between China and Central & East-
ern Europe, which since 2012 has been devel-
oped within the ‘16+1’ format, has become the 
object of heated discussions in the European 
press and within think-tanks1. There is a predom-
inance of critical interpretations which portray 
China’s actions as a strategy of divide et impera, 
aimed at breaking up the unity of the Europe-
an Union. The eleven states which are both EU 
1 EU uneasy over China’s efforts to woo central and 
eastern European states, Financial Times, 8 May 2017; 
https://www.ft.com/content/2e98f6f4-089d-11e7-ac5a-
903b21361b43, China’s investment in influence: the 
future of 16+1 cooperation, ECFR, 2017, http://www.
ecfr.eu/publications/summary/chinas_investment_in_in-
fluence_the_future_of_161_cooperation7204#_ftn1; Ja-
copo Maria Pepe, China’s Inroads into Central, Eastern 
and South Eastern Europe: Regional and Global Implica-
tions for Germany and the EU, DGAP 2017, https://dgap.
org/de/article/getFullPDF/29291
members and participants in the ‘16+1’ format 
have met with criticism from EU partners and 
institutions2. One of the most commonly refer-
enced arguments is the potential impact of en-
hanced economic cooperation with China, which 
is one of the ‘16+1’s main objectives, on the po-
litical choices of the eleven European countries 
which are members of this format. According 
to this narrative, attracting Chinese capital will 
increase dependence on Beijing and lead to in-
dividual governments supporting China’s diplo-
matic initiatives, as well as voting its way in in-
ternational organisations, including EU forums. 
2 Berlin uneasy about Beijing’s growing clout in east-
ern, southern Europe, SCMP, 18 February 2017, http://
www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/arti-
cle/2072046/ Berlin-uneasy-about-beijings-growing-
clout-eastern
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The two most commonly indicated channels for 
the inflow of Chinese capital are direct foreign 
investment and the financing of infrastructure.
China’s economic expansion may indeed be ac-
companied by political risk, at the level of both 
the EU and the individual member states. More-
over, the worst-case scenarios of breaking EU 
unity in relation to China have indeed already 
come to pass in the case of individual countries 
in the region3. However, the current European 
debate on China’s economic presence in Central 
and Eastern Europe contains a number of inac-
curacies, which are impeding a true assessment 
of the scale of the phenomenon and its polit-
ical implications. One of the main problems is 
the lack of precise information on the nature of 
China’s involvement in financing infrastructure 
in CEE. The quality of Chinese offer has been 
only sporadically analysed in the context of the 
region’s economic interests. This often leads 
to the hasty conclusion that the terms Beijing 
presents have met with unanimous enthusiasm 
and do indeed reflect the development needs 
of the region, in all its considerable political and 
economic diversity. Secondly, there is a lack of 
accurate information about the real effects of 
cooperation; as a result, prominent announce-
ments by the leaders and the multi-billion dol-
lar contracts announced by China are treated 
as real commitments, but in fact they often do 
3 In 2016 the common position of the EU Council on Chi-
na’s activities in the South China Sea was blocked by 
Hungary and Greece, as well as Croatia and Slovenia 
(their attitude was most likely influenced by their own 
dispute over territorial waters). Another example of 
the lack of a common EU position was the signing in 
2017of a Joint Declaration on the principles of financing 
the One Belt, One Road initiative by representatives of 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, despite the negative 
recommendation of the European Commission.
not go beyond the realm of declarations. This 
brings about a tendency to overestimate the in-
volvement of Chinese capital in CEE’s eleven EU 
member states, and hence, of Beijing’s political 
influence in the region.
China’s offer to the region
The Chinese offer to finance infrastructure pre-
sented to the sixteen countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe in 2012 was tailored to the 
needs of developing countries without wide 
access to capital. In practice, the line of credit 
for the ‘16+1’, which is worth $10 billion, is not 
significantly different from the instruments Bei-
jing has offered to the rest of the world, includ-
ing South-East Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
As in these other regions, the financial resourc-
es are provided by Chinese state policy banks 
(which achieve the government’s aims by means 
of preferential loans) such as Exim Bank and 
the China Development Bank (CDB), which have 
financed around 85% of the projects’ value. 
These loans are associated with assigning the 
implementation of the whole or a substantial 
part of the projects to Chinese contractors, and 
the inclusion of Chinese suppliers when pur-
chasing most of the components. The final cost 
of the loans depends on many factors, but for 
CEE it should be estimated at 2.5-3% annually4. 
The loans are drawn up for a relatively long pe-
riod (between 20 and 25 years), and they usu-
ally also provide for a few years’ grace period 
in their repayment. One of the most important 
conditions for granting a loan is the guarantee 
of repayment by national governments in case 
the companies raising the loan run into prob-
lems (the so-called sovereign guarantee). These 
rules form a model for funding infrastructure 
which promotes Chinese contractors, technol-
ogy and suppliers. By exporting capital in this 
way, Beijing creates foreign demand for the 
4 According to media reports, this is to be the interest 
rate on loans for Hungary and Serbia. See http://hungar-
ianspectrum.org/tag/chinese-hungarian-relations/
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wildly overgrown Chinese construction sector, 
which has been struggling with a drop-off in 
infrastructure construction within China itself.
By transferring its experiences and models of 
its cooperation with developing countries to 
Central and Eastern Europe, China is offering 
a debt-based model for infrastructure develop-
ment within the ‘16+1’ programme. Beijing’s 
offer would undoubtedly be beneficial to some 
countries of the region, although it has impor-
tant limitations. The Chinese loans, which have 
relatively low interest and extend over many 
years, are especially attractive to governments 
with limited access to the international system 
of development finance and EU funds. China’s 
money has not so far been linked to any de-
mands regarding domestic reforms. Due to 
their extensive know-how, Chinese companies 
are efficient and quick in constructing key in-
frastructure, which is particularly important for 
countries with low institutional capacity5. In the 
case of small economies, however, the Chinese 
funding model involves a risk of a sudden rise in 
debt. In the case of Montenegro, the signing of 
a single contract for the construction of a high-
way has increased the debt in relation to the 
country’s GDP by 23 percent6. Such loans’ con-
ditions are not transparent, which makes it dif-
ficult to assess the projects’ long-term viability. 
Significantly, contracting most of the compo-
nents and materials (and sometimes even the 
labour force) in China means that the capital as-
5 However, this is linked to the idea of leaving the Chinese 
a certain ‘regulatory freedom’, including the possibility 
of tax exemptions. This was done in Montenegro and 
elsewhere.
6 The value of the agreement signed with Exim Bank 
amounted to €800 billion; the GDP of Montenegro at 
that time (2014) was €3.45 billion. See http://www.
reuters.com/article/montenegro-highway-idUSL5N0SP-
4BI20141030
signed to the project immediately flows abroad, 
and does not stimulate the local economies. This 
can significantly hinder debt repayment capaci-
ty in the future, and can also result in problems 
with the balance of payments (with difficulties in 
obtaining foreign currency to pay off the loans)7. 
Transferring the whole of the business risk to 
the local governments does not guarantee the 
involvement of the Chinese side in cultivating 
the project’s long-term profitability.
Infrastructure: ‘11+5’ rather than ‘16’
After five years of the ‘16+1’ format, coopera-
tion in the development of infrastructure has 
become clearly divided along the lines of EU 
membership. In the five countries of the ‘16’ 
which do not belong to the EU (Serbia, Mon-
tenegro, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia & Herze-
govina), the Chinese funding model has been 
used to launch more than a dozen projects, 
worth a total of about €6 billion8. These include 
the construction of coal-fired power stations in 
Kostolac (Serbia) and Tuzla (Bosnia), motorways 
in Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
Macedonia and Albania, as well as part of the 
railway route between Belgrade and Subotica 
(which is part of the route connecting Belgrade 
with Budapest). The use of loans from China’s 
Exim Bank and the CDB in the Western Balkans 
is due to the lack of attractive alternatives for 
financing the huge infrastructure needs of the 
subregion. The Chinese offers frequently beat 
the often fragile financing from Russia (a credit 
line for Serbia), or from the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and 
the World Bank, which is often linked to con-
ditions regarding internal reforms and financial 
discipline, as well as the limited pre-accession 
funds from the EU. 
7 For more on the question of Chinese loans and balances 
of payment in CEE, see http://hcss.nl/sites/default/files/
files/reports/Geoeconomics_Behind_OBOR_FINAL%20
%283%29.pdf
8 www.ebrd.com/documents/comms-and.../see-china-in-
vestments.pdf
The multi-billion dollar contracts an-
nounced by China often do not go beyond 
the realm of declarations.
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Meanwhile, in the eleven countries of the ‘16’ 
which are EU members (hereafter, the EU-11), 
cooperation on infrastructure remains close to 
zero, despite their intensive political contacts 
with China. An analysis of the commitments 
made and announced at the ‘16+1’ summits and 
bilateral meetings shows that, in the case of the 
EU member states, none of the infrastructure 
projects has gone beyond the stage of media 
speculation, political declarations or memoran-
da. Cooperation has not gone forward despite 
China’s conferring obvious political priority to 
the development of transport (roads, airports, 
ports, rail) and energy infrastructure. Despite 
the signing of a memorandum as early as 
2013, projects for nuclear power stations and 
the modernisation of several coal-fired pow-
er plants in Romania have not even begun9. 
So far, the only case where the Chinese fund-
ing model has been used within the EU is the 
construction of the Hungarian section of the 
Belgrade-Budapest railway, described in more 
detail below. It should be noted, though, that 
Chinese companies have been increasingly suc-
cessful in tenders for infrastructures within the 
EU-11 (including the construction of power 
lines). However, they are merely contractors, 
comparable with the European companies 
starting in the tender; the Chinese party here is 
neither an investor nor a lender.
9 In this case, however, the offer from the Chinese policy 
banks was not taken up, funding for the projects was to 
be guaranteed by the ICBC. See http://www.world-nu-
clear.org/information-library/country-profiles/coun-
tries-o-s/romania.aspx
The EU-11’s reluctance to use Chinese loans has 
two main causes:
(a) legal/political. The funding model proposed 
by China, which links loans to the appointment 
of the contractor (without an open tender), and 
also assumes that the local government will 
guarantee the projects (state aid), is incompati-
ble with EU law. The use of Chinese instruments 
is thus associated with the risk of intervention 
by the European Commission. However, it 
should be recalled that the legal formula Chi-
na offers can be also considered unfavourable 
from the point of view of the local communi-
ties. The contracting process is opaque, which 
is bad from the point of view of the local con-
stituencies. And due to their limited participa-
tion in the tenders, this formula is not attractive 
from the point of view of both local and Euro-
pean businesses.
(b) financial/developmental. The EU member 
states currently have a broad choice of financ-
ing tools for infrastructure investments. The 
Chinese offer is just one of many options on 
the table, and it almost always loses out to 
EU funding based on grants. As the structural 
funds, including the TEN-T programme which 
focuses on the development of transport infra-
structure, are effectively a kind of partial grant, 
the Chinese offer (which is based exclusively on 
loans) automatically finds itself in an unfavour-
able position. Even in the field of credit, there 
is competition for Chinese funds from the EU’s 
instruments, which include relatively cheap and 
transparent loans from the European Invest-
ment Bank within the framework of the Euro-
pean Fund for Strategic Investments (the so-
called Juncker Plan). Due to the relatively good 
macroeconomic situation, as well as record low 
interest rates in Europe, it is more favourable 
for most countries to contract a debt through 
long-term bonds than to take a loan from Chi-
na. The CDB and Exim Bank, which raise capi-
tal for the Chinese market, cannot offer credits 
below the Chinese interest rate (and must also 
impose margins).
China’s offers to finance infrastructure 
within the ‘16+1’ format are not significantly 
different from the instruments Beijing offers 
the rest of the world.
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By obtaining financing for their development, 
the CEE states are thus approaching the infra-
structure development question in a pragmatic 
manner, and are avoiding contracting debt in 
unfavourable economic conditions – debt which 
in addition comes loaded with the risk of vio-
lating the local legal system, and with potential 
political costs. Since 2012, when China made its 
financial offer to the region, dozens of infrastruc-
ture projects have been started in the EU-11 in 
the fields of energy, rail and road construction. 
Every year projects worth tens of billions of eu-
ros are initiated in the region10. So far, however, 
these have not been financed using the instru-
ments offered by China. In 2015-2017, the pro-
jects initiated in the EU-11 based on loans from 
the so-called Juncker Plan, which have mostly 
focused on infrastructure, have reached the val-
ue of €4.8 billion11. The region’s infrastructure 
needs remain very substantial; but for now it 
can, and does, take advantage of a very wide 
range of development offers from the EU.
The only deviation from this trend is the project 
to modernise the Budapest–Belgrade railway 
connection on the Hungarian side. The fund-
ing and implementation agreement for this 
project was signed in 2013, and on its basis a 
Chinese/Hungarian consortium was created to 
implement the project, with a value of US$1.67 
billion (a total of US$2.89 billion including the 
10 In the period 2007-2015, the average value of contract-
ed projects within the framework of European funds – 
less the contribution of the states themselves – ran at 
around €20 billion euros annually for the EU-11. A sub-
stantial part of this sum was assigned to the upgrading 
of infrastructure. See https://assets.kpmg.com/content/
dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/06/EU-Funds-in-Central-and-East-
ern-Europe.pdf
11 This figure does not include cross-border projects. See 
http://www.eib.org/efsi/efsi-projects/index.htm
Serbian section). The details of the project re-
main opaque; the feasibility study has been 
classified for 10 years. The European Commis-
sion has started an investigation with regard to 
the project, due to suspected breaches of EU 
law, including in the tendering procedures.12 
The motives of the Hungarian side are unclear. 
The upgraded stretch of track between Buda-
pest and Kelebia has not been included in the 
TEN-T network, which has narrowed down its 
financing options. At the time of the agree-
ment, Hungary was in a worse economic situa-
tion than at present, and had difficulty attract-
ing foreign investments. However, it cannot be 
ruled out that in this case, the political calcu-
lation on the part of the government of Vik-
tor Orbán could have been given priority over 
purely economic calculation – with the aim of 
strengthening his country’s bilateral relation-
ship with China. It must be stressed, howev-
er, that this project is a clear exception to the 
general trends in the financing of infrastructure 
within the EU-11.
China’s attempt to adapt
The inadequacy of the Chinese model for fi-
nancing infrastructure in relation to the de-
velopment needs of the EU-11 has been com-
municated to China by the local participants in 
the ‘16+1’ format. Beijing seems to have taken 
note of the current ineffectiveness of its policy, 
and is trying to adapt its activities to local cir-
cumstances. One essential course of action is 
to create instruments in which Chinese financial 
institutions and companies would act as genu-
ine investors, locating their own funds in the 
region and assuming part of the business risk. 
In parallel with the establishment of its cred-
it line, Exim Bank has created a private equity 
fund (focusing on the multiplication of capital 
12 EU sets collision course with China over ‘Silk Road’ 
rail project, Financial Times, 20 February 2017, https://
www.f t.com/content /003bad14-f52f-11e6-95ee-
f14e55513608
The EU’s priorities are to adapt the Chinese 
offer to EU conditions, and to take account 
of the needs of European business.
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through the acquisition and sale of private com-
panies) called the China-CEE Fund, which has 
US$435 million at its disposal. So far it has con-
fined itself to investing in existing companies 
(including wind farms), and despite announce-
ments to this end, the fund has not been en-
larged with any further financing. Since 2015 
the creation by the Chinese commercial bank 
ICBC of a new Sino-CEE Financial Holding Fund 
has been discussed with local governments. 
This would be targeted at long-term invest-
ments in infrastructure projects in the region. 
Creating this type of instrument, however, re-
quires a balance between local interests (new 
infrastructure, the possibility of local business-
es getting involved) and Chinese interests (an 
increase in demand for Chinese components), 
while at the same time respecting EU law.
Further adjustments of this kind would mean 
a change in China’s role in the region, from be-
ing a lender to becoming a genuine investor. 
However, this would require a certain amount 
of flexibility on the part of Beijing, as well as 
coordination within the region. The current of-
fer presented in the ‘16+1’ framework does not 
derive from global trends in Chinese foreign 
policy; the Chinese institutions involved apply 
the financing rules described above around 
the world. This is demonstrated by the devel-
opment of financial instruments within the 
framework of the One Belt, One Road project; 
the majority of the funds for infrastructure de-
velopment in Eurasia announced by Xi Jinping 
during the One Belt, One Road forum in 2017 
are supposed to come from credit lines from 
the CDB and Exim Bank13. The Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank (AIIB), founded in 
2015, seems to offer a more transparent and 
open funding model, although so far its activ-
ities have been limited to Asia. The inertia of 
the Chinese institutions involved, and the fact 
that China is used to applying its own rules for 
finance, may increase the political pressure to 
apply them in Central and Eastern Europe. 
In the face of increasing debate on the EU’s fu-
ture role in financing investment in the Central 
European region, a scenario is possible whereby 
the Chinese offer to the EU-11 becomes more 
attractive in an indirect way – by limiting the 
alternatives. The distance between Central Eu-
rope and the rest of the EU as regards the level 
of infrastructure is still very large; the region will 
still be wrestling with the need to expand its 
energy and transport infrastructure in the com-
ing years. At the same time, the countries in the 
region have still not yet built up enough of their 
own capital which could meet their investment 
needs, and so they continue to depend on cap-
ital from the rest of the world. So far the local 
governments have showed a degree of pragma-
tism, opting for methods which maximise their 
financial and developmental benefits. If the next 
EU budget after 2020 reveals potential limita-
tions to funding for the development of Central 
and Eastern Europe – because of a significant 
reduction in the figures, or if funds are directed 
to sectors which do not cover the development 
objectives in the region – then China’s offer 
could automatically become more attractive. 
This would put the countries in the region in 
a much more difficult situation, in which they will 
have to consider their further support for eco-
nomic development, and whether they should 
utilise the financing conditions presented by Chi-
na, which are not always favourable to them.
13 The credit lines announced in the meantime for the im-
plementation of the initiative amounted to US$38 bil-
lion for the CDB, and US$20 billion for Exim Bank. The 
Silk Road Fund investment fund was then increased by 
about US$15 billion. The capital at the AIIB’s disposal 
runs at around US$100 billion.
Beijing has failed to obtain the political 
tools which could have weakened policy 
coherence at the European level, or even 
divided the EU.
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Implications for EU policy
• Due to the low attractiveness of the Chi-
nese offer to finance infrastructure, the risk of 
a breakdown of cohesion within the EU as 
a result of CEE’s economic dependence on Chi-
na remains small. Nor will the development of 
political cooperation between Central & Eastern 
Europe with China undermine European legisla-
tion on tenders and public aid. However, build-
ing up CEE’s support for the EU’s general agenda 
regarding China remains a challenge due to the 
risks that could be observed in the cases of many 
other EU member states – individual leaders 
within the region may find it more attractive to 
pursue their interests by building up bilateral re-
lations with China. A uniform position is thus in 
part dependent on considering the region’s ob-
jectives as part of the EU’s policy towards China.
• The use of the debt model to finance infrastruc-
ture, which threatens a breach of EU law and 
macroeconomic risks, will remain negligible – as 
long as the EU continues to make an attractive 
developmental offer to the region. It is also pos-
sible that the Chinese offer will be successfully 
adapted to the region’s circumstances (includ-
ing EU law), and that the participation of Chi-
nese capital will increase. This would allow the 
creation of synergies between the EU’s policies 
and the actions of China, including the accelera-
tion of real convergence. However, there is a risk 
of an adverse scenario: namely, that China fails 
to adapt, while the EU simultaneously reduces its 
offer of development deals. Due to the still press-
ing need to upgrade their infrastructure, in the 
long term this may encourage the countries of 
the region to take advantage of the Chinese debt 
model. This could result in an increase in the le-
gal, political and economic risks described above.
• The EU has the space to facilitate constructive 
economic relationships between China and CEE, 
and to counter potential threats. The priorities 
remain: to adapt the Chinese offer to EU condi-
tions, and to take account of the needs of Euro-
pean business. It is important to reduce Beijing’s 
political pressure to use the current model to fi-
nance infrastructure development within the EU. 
An important legal challenge will lie in increasing 
the openness and transparency of the process, 
as well as supporting a change in the nature of 
the Chinese commitment from one based on 
debt to one based on investment, while finding 
a balance of positions between all the interest-
ed parties. This is a job for the EU’s institutions, 
for specialised agencies such as the as EU-China 
Connectivity Platform, as well as for the member 
states concerned.
